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Constitutional: MINNESOTA' RECOGNIZES A RIGHT OF PRIVACY: State v.
Gray, 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987).
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court recently held that the right of
privacy embodied in the Federal Constitution does not protect those
who engage in homosexual sodomy.' The Court upheld the consti-
tutionality of the Georgia sodomy statute which makes it an offense
to engage in sodomy regardless of the sex or consent of the partner. 2
In a case challenging the constitutionality of a similar statute, the
Minnesota Supreme Court in State v. Gray3 explicitly recognized that
the right of privacy exists in the Minnesota Bill of Rights.4 The court
held, however, that the right of privacy does not extend to include
those who engage in "commercial sex."5 Gray represents an impor-
tant decision for the court because it opens the issue of whether the
newly found right of privacy under the Minnesota Bill of Rights is
broader in scope than the right of privacy found under the United
States Constitution. The Minnesota Supreme Court left unanswered
the question of whether the right of privacy in the Minnesota Bill of
1. Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986). This decision was immediately
criticized for singling out the aspect that Hardwick was a homosexual. The Court
justified its decision that the Georgia sodomy statute did not violate the fundamental
rights of homosexuals on the basis that fundamental rights are those "implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty" and "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradi-
tion." Id. at 2844. The Court held that fundamental rights include only those bear-
ing on family, marriage, or procreation. Id.
2. Id. at 2846. The Georgia statute provides in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits the offense of sodomy when he performs or submits
to any sexual act involving the sex organs of one person and the mouth
or anus of another...
(b) A person convicted of the offense of sodomy shall be punished by im-
prisonment for not less than one nor more than 20 years. ...
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-6-2 (1984).
3. 413 N.W.2d 107 (Minn. 1987).
4. The court stated, "[a] comparison of the Minnesota Bill of Rights with the
federal constitutional provisions upon which the right of privacy is founded shows
that the rights protected by the Federal Constitution are also protected by the Minne-
sota Bill of Rights." Id. at I11.
5. Id. at 114. Although Gray denied paying for sex with the complainant, the
court felt there was adequate evidence to show that the offense was commercial sex.
1
Cashman et al.: Recent Developments in Minnesota Law
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1988
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Rights protects the right of homosexual or heterosexual couples to
engage in sodomy, an argument which the United States Supreme
Court rejected in Bowers v. Hardwick. The Minnesota Supreme Court
did not address whether the right to privacy extends to privacy rights
recognized in Griswold v. Connecticut 6 and Roe v. Wade 7.
II. BOWERS V. HARDWICK
In Bowers v. Hardwick8 the United States Supreme Court distin-
guished prior opinions and concluded that the Federal Constitution
does not confer "a fundamental right upon homosexuals to engage
in sodomy."9 Homosexual activity was completely unrelated to the
constitutionally protected areas of family, marriage, and procrea-
tion.10 The Court found that, unlike traditionally protected rights,
homosexual sodomy was not "implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty" or "deeply rooted in this Nation's history and tradition."l"
Furthermore, the Court rejected the assertion that Hardwick's con-
duct, committed in the privacy of his own home, deserved special
protection under the analysis used in Stanley v. Georgia.12 According
to the Court, the rights at issue in Stanley stemmed from the text of
the first amendment, which bore no indication to the right to engage
in sodomy.t3 The same dual right of privacy argument, the right of
privacy in personal decisions and the right of privacy in particular
places,14 was argued by the plaintiff in Gray.
6. 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold a statute banning the use of contraceptives
was ruled unconstitutional as applied to married couples. The Griswold decision pro-
duced two rules. First, the marital bedroom is off limits to state regulation. Second,
any statute which can only be enforced by pillaging the same bedroom is unconstitu-
tional. Id. at 485-86.
7. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right of privacy extends to a woman's decision whether
or not to have an abortion).
8. 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986).
9. Id. at 2843.
10. The court also stated that "any claim that these cases nevertheless stand for
the proposition that any kind of private sexual conduct between consenting adults is
constitutionally insulated from state proscription is unsupportable." Id. at 2844 (cit-
ing Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 688 n.5, 694 n.17 (1977); Griswold
v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)).
11. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2844. To the contrary, the Court found a long tradition
of prohibiting homosexual sodomy which stretched back to the English Reformation
and Roman criminal codes. Id. at 2847 (Burger, C.J., concurring).
12. 394 U.S. 557 (1969). In Stanley, the Court held that the first amendment
prevents convictions for reading or keeping obscene material in one's own home. In
general, illegal conduct is not always protected when it is carried out in the home,
such as using drugs, or possessing firearms, or committing sexual crimes. Id. at 568.
13. Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846.
14. See id. at 2850-51 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973) (privacy interests in making certain decisions); United States v. Karo, 468
U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (right of privacy in private residence)).
[Vol. 14
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III. STATE V. GRAY
In State v. Gray, the complainant was arrested by the police in con-
nection with a boat theft from Gray's house. 15 The complainant, a
sixteen-year old boy,16 made two statements to the police in which
he stated that he had three sexual contacts with Gray, for which he
was paid varying amounts of money.17 Gray also voluntarily gave a
statement to the police. He admitted that he met the complainant
while driving near Loring Park in Minneapolis, but claimed that he
had sex with him on only one occasion.18 In his statement, Gray ad-
mitted giving the money to the complainant but considered it a loan
not a payment for sex. 19 Based on his admissions, Gray was charged
with criminal sodomy under Minnesota Statute section 609.293.20
Gray moved to dismiss the charge on the ground that section
609.293, subdivision 5 was unconstitutional and violated his right of
privacy, as protected by the United States Constitution and the Min-
nesota Constitution.21 Subsequently, the United States Supreme
Court decided Bowers which erased Gray's argument that the Minne-
sota statute violated his right to privacy guaranteed by the United
States Constitution. 2 2
The trial court dismissed the complaint holding that the Minne-
sota statute was "unconstitutionally broad and infringes upon the
right of privacy granted by the Minnesota Constitution on its face
15. Gray, 413 N.W.2d at 108. The complainant was arrested during an investiga-
tion of two boat thefts.
16. Since the complainant informed Gray that he was 18 years old at the time and
Gray reasonably assumed that he was an adult, the complainant was considered a
consenting adult. Id. at 113 n.5. Gray was particularly concerned about the age of
the complainant because Gray was on probation for a conviction for committing fel-
latio with a boy between the age of 13 and 16. Id.
17. The complainant gave conflicting statements to the police concerning the
amounts of money received and the dates of sexual contact. He changed the dates
because he did not want it known he was engaging in prostitution after May, 1985, as
he had a previous charge of prostitution in May of that year. The discrepancy in
money was attributed to drinking. Id. at 108-09.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Minnesota Statute section 609.293 provides in pertinent part:
Subdivision 1. Definition. "Sodomy" means carnally knowing any person
by the anus or by or with the mouth...
Subdivision 5. Consensual acts. Whoever, in cases not coming within the
provisions of sections 609.342 or 609.344, voluntarily engages in or submits
to an act of sodomy with another may be sentenced to imprisonment for not
more than one year or to payment of a fine of not more than $3,000, or
both.
MINN. STAT. § 609.293 (1984).
21. See Gray, 413 N.W.2d at 109-110 (right of privacy challenge as applied).
22. Id. at 110.
1988]
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and as applied to [Gray]." 23 The state then appealed to the Minne-
sota Supreme Court which granted the state's petition for acceler-
ated review.24
Upon review, the supreme court compared the Minnesota Bill of
Rights with the Federal Constitution and found the same rights of
privacy embodied in the Federal Constitution present in the Minne-
sota counterpart. 2 5 Although the Minnesota Supreme Court had
previously recognized the right of privacy, it had never "rooted that
right in the Minnesota Constitution." 2 6
Having recognized the right to privacy, the court stated:
We are not limited by United States Supreme Court decisions ...
the protection we afford cannot be less than that afforded by the
Federal Constitution, but it is equally certain that we can afford
more protection under our constitution than is afforded under the
Federal Constitution. 2
7
Furthermore, the court stated they were not restricted in finding
only those fundamental rights "expressly stated in our
Constitution.'"28
Disagreeing with the trial court, the supreme court found that
Gray lacked standing "to champion the causes of others in situations
not before [the] court." 29 Gray argued that he had standing based
on the impact the case would have on third party rights3 0 and the
exception regarding first amendment rights which allows persons to
champion third party rights where those rights are at issue.31 The
court rejected both arguments; with respect to the first argument,
the court found that third parties' rights were not so directly affected
by the litigation that Gray should be allowed standing to challenge
the statute as facially overbroad.32 The court then found the first
amendment issue of freedom of association was not reached because
"the first amendment overbreadth doctrine is 'strong medicine' to be
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at I11.
26. Id. at 110 (citing Minnesota State Board of Health v. City of Brainerd, 308
Minn. 24, 241 N.W.2d 624 (1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 803; Price v. Sheppard,
307 Minn. 250, 239 N.W.2d 905 (1976)).
27. Id. at I11.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 112.
30. Id.
31. The party in court has standing to challenge "because persons whose expres-
sion is constitutionally protected may well refrain from exercising their rights for fear
of criminal sanctions provided by a statute susceptible to application to protected
expression." Id. at 113 (citing Koppinger v. City of Fairmont, 311 Minn. 186, 200,
248 N.W.2d 708, 716 (1976)).
32. Id. See also Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
[Vol. 14
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employed with hesitation and, then 'only as a last resort.' "33
The issue then boiled down to whether "the sodomy statute, as
applied to Gray in this case, unconstitutionally violates the right of
privacy." 34 The supreme court found the sodomy statute constitu-
tional as applied to Gray based on the certainty that the sodomy oc-
curred as a result of a pay-for-sex relationship.35 The court felt
sexual conduct with a prostitute was "public" whereas the right to
privacy only protected "private" sexual conduct between consenting
adults.36 Gray's relationship with the complainant was "public" sex-
ual conduct in character since the two did not know each other, and
Gray paid for the sex. 37 Although Gray argued it was sexual conduct
in the privacy of his own home, Chief Justice Amdahl focused on the
fact that the conduct was prostitution, stating, "It is simply wrong to
say that the sexual conduct in this case became private once the bed-
room door was closed."3 8 Also, the sexual conduct committed by
Gray was "public" in nature because prostitution is negotiated in
public and because it carried a risk to the public of veneral disease
and criminal activity.3 9 Since the facts supported a charge of prosti-
tution, 40 the court refused to extend a right of privacy to protect in-
dividuals like Gray, who engage in sodomous "commercial sex."
4 1
To extend the right of privacy to protect those in a sex-for-compen-
sation relationship would "debase both the Constitution and the
concept of fundamental rights."4
2
33. Id. at 113 (citing New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 769 (1982)).
34. Id.
35. In State v. Schmit, 273 Minn. 78, 139 N.W.2d 800 (1965), the court men-
tioned in dicta that "[w]hether a female is a 'public Prostitute' is of no moment in a
sodomous act." Id. at 91, 139 N.W.2d at 809. This does not coincide with what the
court held in Gray where the statute is applicable primarily because the consenting
partner is a prostitute. 413 N.W.2d at 114.
36. The court tried to inject the word "public" into the phrase "private sexual
conduct" used by Gray. To do so seems misplaced because, although negotiated in
public, the sexual act is carried out in private. Furthermore, the charge of prostitu-
tion provides an offense for the act of selling sex, where the "commercial" portion of
the "transaction" is carried out in public.
37. Id. at 113-14.
38. Id. at 114.
39. Id. It is interesting to note the similarity of the Minnesota court's justification
for finding Gray's conduct "public" and the state of Georgia's justification for its
sodomy statute. In its brief, the state argued in Bowers that sodomy may have "seri-
ous adverse consequences 'for the general public health and welfare,' such as com-
municable diseases or fostering criminal activity." Bowers, 106 S. Ct. at 2846, 2853
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing Brief for Respondent).
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IV. CONCLUSION
In Gray, the court recognized a right of privacy in the Minnesota
Constitution, but apparently distinguished the issue in Gray from
that asserted in Bowers. Although refusing to define the right of pri-
vacy as narrowly as the United States Supreme Court, the Minnesota
Supreme Court found the issue in Gray to be "public" consensual
sodomy in the form of "commercial sex," as opposed to Bowers,
where the conduct was clearly of a private nature. The Minnesota
Supreme Court neatly sidestepped the issue of whether the right to
privacy protects private non-commercial sex engaged in by con-
senting heterosexual and homosexual couples. One can imply from
the decision that the reason the court did not address the issue was
its unwillingness to let the Minnesota Constitution protect an admit-
ted sex offender.
Finally, the court's analysis bears resemblance to that used in Stan-
ley, which recognized that the right of privacy under the Federal Con-
stitution does not protect "victimless crimes" committed in the
home such as possession of stolen property, drugs or firearms.4S If
prostitution is a "victimless crime" as explained in Stanley, Gray's
sexual conduct would not be protected under the right of privacy. It
is not clear in Stanley, however, whether that particular crime must be
what is at issue in the case to justify such an analysis. Since the
charge of prostitution was not the issue in Gray, nor was it absolutely
proven, the court may have refrained from actually basing its deci-
sion on Stanley.4 4 Instead, the court formulated the "commercial
sex" distinction to find Gray's conduct unprotected. The court did
offer encouragement, however, to a later challenge to the Minnesota
sodomy statute by holding that the Minnesota Constitution does
confer a right of privacy.45
Torts: MINNESOTA REJECTS THE "ALTERNATIVE DESIGN" TEST IN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAw: Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92
(Minn. 1987).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Minnesota courts have long recognized that the plaintiff in a
strict products liability case has the burden of establishing that the
43. Stanley v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 557, 568 n. 11.
44. Id.
45. Gray, 413 N.W.2d at 114.
[Vol. 14
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defendant's product was defective and unreasonably dangerous.I
Cases involving an alleged design defect are judged by the reason-
able-care balancing test adopted by the Minnesota Supreme Court in
Holm v. Sponco Manufacturing, Inc.2 This test states:
[A] manufacturer is obligated to exercise that degree of care in his
plan or design so as to avoid any unreasonable risk of harm to any-
one who is likely to be exposed to the danger when the product is
used in the manner for which the product was intended, as well as
an unintended yet reasonably foreseeable use.
What constitutes "reasonable care" will, of course, vary with the
surrounding circumstances and will involve "a balancing of the
likelihood of harm, and the gravity of harm if it happens, against the
burden of the precaution which would be effective to avoid the harm. "3
The express language of this test requires evidence of a "precau-
tion which would be effective to avoid the harm."4 It also requires a
showing of the "burden" associated with the potential adoption of
that precaution.5 This test clearly refers to the necessity of proof of
an alternative feasible safer design.6 Those courts applying the rea-
sonable-care balancing test have traditionally placed the burden of
1. In Lee v. Crookston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 290 Minn. 321, 188 N.W.2d 426
(1971), the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted strict liability as a theory of recovery
in products liability. The elements that the plaintiff must establish are: (1) that the
defendant's product was in a defective condition unreasonably dangerous for its in-
tended use; (2) that the defect existed when the product left the defendant's control;
and (3) that the defect was the proximate cause of the injury sustained. Id. at 329,
188 N.W.2d at 432.
2. 324 N.W.2d 207 (Minn. 1982).
3. Id. at 212 (quoting Micallefv. Miehle Co., 39 N.Y.2d 376, 385-86, 348 N.E.2d
571, 577-78, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115, 121 (1976)) (emphasis added). See also Wilson v.
Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 66, 577 P.2d 1322, 1325-26, reh'g denied, 579 P.2d
1287 (1978). In design defect products liability cases, the Oregon Supreme Court
also requires the court or trier of fact to balance the utility of the product's risk
against its magnitude when deciding whether to submit the question of a design de-
fect to the jury. Id. at 66, 577 P.2d at 1326.
4. The reasonable-care balancing test was originally enunciated in Micallef, 39
N.Y.2d at 385-86, 348 N.E.2d at 577-78, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 121. Micallef involved a
products liability design defect claim where the plaintiff's hand was injured while
operating a photo-offset press machine manufactured and sold by Miehle-Gross
Porter, Inc. The court held that the reasonable-care balancing test was the proper
standard to follow in determining whether the photo-offset press machine was defec-
tively designed. Id.
5. Id.
6. In Micallef, the court stated that "[u]nder this approach, [the reasonable-care
balancing test], 'the plaintiff endeavors to show the jury such facts as that competitors
used the safety device which was missing here, or that a cotter pin costing a penny
could have prevented the accident.' " Id. at 386, 348 N.E.2d at 578, 384 N.Y.S.2d at
121. In a subsequent design defect products liability case, the same court declared:
"The plaintiff, of course, is under an obligation to present evidence that the product,
as designed, was not reasonably safe because there was a substantial likelihood of
harm and it was feasible to design the product in a safer manner." Voss v. Black &
1988]
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proof on the plaintiff to establish an alternative feasible safer de-
sign.7 Without such evidence, the test cannot be properly per-
formed. Yet, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Kalio v. Ford Motor
Co.,8 applied this balancing test without requiring the plaintiff to
prove the existence of an alternative feasible safer design.9 As this
Casenote shall demonstrate, however, the Kallio court's application
of the reasonable-care balancing test was clearly erroneous and
should be rectified.
II. FACTS OF KALLIO
In Kalio, the accident giving rise to the products liability claim oc-
curred in September of 1978.10 Robert Kallio was driving his 1977
Ford F-150 pickup truck home from work when it suddenly began to
rain.I Kallio pulled to the side of the road intending to get out of
the cab and cover some tools in the bed of the truck.12 He stopped
the truck and shifted the automatic transmission lever into park.13
He did not set the parking brake nor did he shut the engine off. 14
Kallio jumped on the rear bumper to cover the tools and noticed
that the truck was moving in reverse. 15 He then ran back to the
truck's cab and tried to re-enter the vehicle, but slipped on the pave-
ment and fell.16 The truck rolled over Kallio, injuring his legs and a
hand.17
Kallio brought suit against Ford, claiming that the design of the
truck's automatic transmission shifting mechanism was defective.18
Ford argued that Kallio failed to meet his burden of proof because
Decker Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y. 2d 102, 108, 450 N.E.2d 204, 208, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398, 402
(1983).
7. See infra notes 34-37 and accompanying text.
8. 407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1987).
9. The Kalio court held that the "existence of a safer, practical alternative de-
sign is not an element of an alleged defective product design prima facie case." Id. at
97.
10. See Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 391 N.W.2d 860, 861 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
The plaintiff purchased the vehicle in 1977. It was equipped with a C-6 automatic
transmission and a gearshift selector lever mounted on the steering column. Brief
for Appellant at 4, Kallio v. Ford Motor Co., 407 N.W.2d 92 (Minn. 1987) C4-85-
2126.
11. Id.





17. Id. A passenger sitting in the cab succeeded in stopping the vehicle after
Kallio was injured.
18. Kallio also claimed that the truck was defective because Ford failed to warn of
the potential dangers arising from operator misuse. Id. at 93-94.
[Vol. 14
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he did not show that a safer alternative design was feasible at the
time of manufacture.19 Accordingly, Ford contended that the plain-
tiff could not logically recover on the basis of a design defect.20 The
jury, however, concluded that the truck was defective.21 The court of
appeals affirmed.22 The Minnesota Supreme Court, in affirming the
court of appeals, held that it was not necessary for the plaintiff to
establish evidence of an alternative feasible safer design in a strict
product liability case based on an alleged design defect.23
III. THE REASONABLE-CARE BALANCING TEST
In Holm v. Sponco Manufacturing, Inc., the Minnesota Supreme
Court adopted the reasonable-care balancing test in order to deter-
mine whether a design defect existed in the product.24 In Holm, the
plaintiff was severely injured while operating an aerial ladder manu-
factured by the defendant when he came in contact with a high-volt-
age power line.25 In determining whether the manufacturer was
liable, the court abandoned the latent-patent rule,26 and embraced
the reasonable-care balancing test, which was originally enunciated
by the New York Court of Appeals in Micallef v. Miehle Co.27
Micallef was a product liability action in which the plaintiff alleged
that the manufacturer negligently designed its product.28 In deter-
mining whether the manufacturer exercised the appropriate degree
of care in the design of the product, the court stated, "What consti-
tutes 'reasonable care' will, of course, vary with the surrounding cir-
cumstances and will involve a balancing of the likelihood of harm,
and the gravity of the harm if it happens, against the burden of the
19. Id. at 96.
20. Kalio, 391 N.W.2d 860, 863 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
21. The jury in Kalio was not asked to separately determine whether the defect in
the Ford truck was a design defect in the parking system or a failure to give an ade-
quate warning. Kallio, 407 N.W.2d at 94 n.2. The jury instruction stated in part:
"'Was the 1977 Ford pickup defective and unreasonably dangerous to the users, with
respect to the Park System?" Id. at 94.
22. Kalio, 391 N.W.2d at 865.
23. Kallio, 407 N.W.2d at 97.
24. See Holm v. Sponco Mfg., Inc., 324 N.W.2d 207, 213 (Minn. 1982).
25. Id. at 208.
26. Id. at 213. Holm overruled Halvorson v. American Hoist & Derrick Co., 307
Minn. 48, 240 N.W.2d 303 (1976), which had provided that a manufacturer would
not be liable to an injured plaintiff if the risk was obvious, known by all involved, and
was specifically warned against. Id. at 57, 240 N.W.2d at 308. See also Comment,
Obviousness of Product Dangers as a Bar to Recovery: Minnesota Apparently Adopts the Latent-
Patent Doctrine, 3 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 241 (1977).
27. 39 N.Y.2d 376, 348 N.E.2d 571, 384 N.Y.S.2d 115. See also supra note 4 and
accompanying text.
28. See Micahlef, 39 N.Y.2d at 374, 348 N.E.2d at 573, 384 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
1988]
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precaution which would be effective to avoid the harm."2 9
The same court later stated that "[t]he plaintiff, of course, is under
an obligation to present evidence that the product, as designed, was
not reasonably safe because there was a substantial likelihood of
harm and it was feasible to design the product in a safer manner."30
It is therefore clear that the court from which Minnesota adopted the
reasonable-care balancing test requires the plaintiff to present evi-
dence of an alternative feasible safer design as part of its prima facie
case. 3
1
Other jurisdictions which use a similar balancing test also require
the plaintiff to establish evidence of a safer product design which is
both technologically feasible and practicable. The Nebraska
Supreme Court has held that a plaintiff must show that there was
some practicable way in which the design could have been made
safer in order to prove that the product was defectively designed.32
In Maryland, the court of special appeals has stated that in order to
carry a case to the jury, the plaintiff must produce evidence which
will show the technological feasibility of manufacturing a product
with a safer design at the time the suspect product was manufac-
tured.3 3 Also, the Oregon Supreme Court has declared that if a de-
fendant is to be found liable for an alleged design defect, then the
plaintiff's prima facie case "must show more than a technical possi-
bility of a safer design."34 Other courts also require the plaintiff to
provide evidence of an alternative, feasible safer design.3 5
29. Id.
30. Voss, 59 N.Y.2d at 108, 450 N.E.2d at 208, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 402 (1983). The
Voss court further stated that the defendant manufacturer may also present evidence
in order to refute plaintiff's claim that the product was not safe due to its defective
design. It is then up to the jury to weigh all the evidence and balance the product's
risk against its utility and cost. Id.
31. In both Micallef and Voss, the New York Court of Appeals clearly stated that
under the reasonable-care balancing test, the plaintiff must present evidence of an
alternative feasible safer design.
32. See Nerud v. Haybuster Mfg., Inc., 215 Neb. 604, 613, 340 N.W.2d 369, 375
(1983).
33. See Troja v. Black & Decker Mfg., Inc., 62 Md. App. 101, 109, 488 A.2d 516,
518 (1985).
34. See Wilson, 282 Or. at 66, 577 P.2d at 1326.
35. See Huddell v. Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737 (3d Cir. 1976) ("in establishing that
the design in question was defective, the plaintiff must offer proof of an alternative,
safer design, practicable under the circumstances"); Baker v. Chrysler Corp., 55 Cal.
App. 3d 710, 127 Cal. Rptr. 745, 749 (1976) (required injured plaintiff to show alter-
native designs for the product since plaintiff always has the burden to prove the exist-
ence of the defect); McClelland v. Chicago Transit Authority, 34 Ill. App. 3d 151,
340 N.E.2d 61 (1975). In McClelland, the court stated:
In order to impose strict liability for defective design, the plaintiff must es-
tablish that the product has not lived up to the required standard of safety
.... The standard of proof necessary is that (1) the product as designed is
incapable of preventing the injury complained of; (2) there existed an alter-
[Vol. 14
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IV. THE KALLIO DECISION
The Kalio court was faced with the issue of whether a plaintiff in a
strict product liability case, based on an alleged design defect, must
establish that at the time of manufacture an alternative feasible safer
design existed.36 Minnnesota requires that a plaintiff in a strict prod-
ucts liability case establish that the product was both unreasonably
dangerous and in a defective condition.3 7 And, as the Kallio court
correctly noted, "the plaintiff ordinarily has the burden of showing
the existence of an alternative design that was safer."38 Further,
when the court examined the history of Minnesota's design defect
cases, it discovered that "as a practical matter, successful plaintiffs,
almost without fail, introduce evidence of an alternative safer de-
sign." 39 Yet in spite of these well-established persuasive precedents
and the rulings in accord from numerous other jurisdictions, the Kal-
ho court chose a most disappointing and fallacious path in declaring
that a plaintiff is not required to show proof of an alternative feasible
safer design in design defect cases.
V. RAMIFICATIONS OF KALLIO
In light of the Kallio court's pronouncement regarding alternative
designs, the application of the reasonable-care balancing test can
only be illusory at best.40 As has been noted, both a strict literal
interpretation and a practical application of the reasonable-care bal-
ancing test require the production of evidence of an alternative feasi-
ble safer design.41 Absent such evidence, the balancing required by
the test cannot possibly be accurately performed.42 Thus, the Kallio
decision appears to deal a critical blow to the court's purported use
of the reasonable-care balancing test in strict product liablility claims
based on alleged design defects.
native design which would have prevented the injury; and (3) in terms of
cost, practicability and technological possibility, the alternative design was
feasible.
Id. at 153, 340 N.E.2d at 63.
36. This would require plaintiff to present sufficient evidence of an alternative
feasible safer design of the product at the time it was originally sold. Absent such
evidence, the plaintiff would not be able to make a prima facie design defect case.
Kalio, 407 N.W.2d at 95.
37. See supra note 1.
38. Kalio, 407 N.W.2d at 96.
39. Id. at n.6.
40. "[B]y its very terms, the [test] requires evidence of a 'precaution which would
be effective to prevent the harm,' as well as evidence of the 'burden' associated with
that precaution." Brief for Appellant, supra note 10, at 13.
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Torts: DUAL CAPACITY EXCEPTION UNLIKELY IN MINNESOTA: Egeland
v. State, 408 N.W.2d 848 (Minn. 1987).
I. INTRODUCTION
The exclusive-remedy provision of a workers' compensation stat-
ute generally acts as a bar to all common law claims by an employee
against an employer for work-related injuries.' In Minnesota, this
provision states in pertinent part: "The liability of an employer pre-
scribed by this chapter is exclusive and in the place of any other lia-
bility to such employee, personal representative, surviving spouse,
parent, any child, dependent, next of kin, or other person entitled to
recover damages on account of such injury or death."2
Under a workers' compensation statute, an employee gives up the
right to pursue a common law remedy for an employment-related
injury or death.3 The employee, however, gains the advantage of a
guaranteed or almost guaranteed recovery of workers' compensation
benefits.4 The statute presupposes that certainty of benefits is pre-
ferred to the common law remedy an injured employee may have
against an employer.5 On the other hand, an employer under the
statute is liable to pay workers' compensation benefits regardless of
fault.6 In exchange, the employer is protected from the risk of a po-
tentially large damage verdict.7
Recently, several jurisdictions have recognized certain limited ex-
ceptions to the exclusive-remedy provision.8 These exceptions are
based on the principle that there are circumstances under which an
1. See Comment, Workmen's Compensation and Employer Suability: The Dual-Capacity
Doctrine, 5 ST. MARY'S L.J. 818, 818-19 (1974).
2. MINN. STAT. § 176.031 (1986).
3. Id.
4. See Note, Workers' Compensation: The Dual-Capacity Doctrine, 6 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 813, 814 (1980) [hereinafter Workers'Compensation]. "Under workers' compensa-
tion statutes, the employee has sacrificed the sometimes uncertain common-law rem-
edy for employment-related injuries in return for almost certain recovery of workers'
compensation benefits regardless of employer fault." Id. at 813-14. See also Note,
Dual-Capacity Doctrine: Third-Party Liability of Employer-Manufacturer in Products Liability
Litigation, 12 IND. L. REV. 553, 556-57 (1979) [hereinafter Dual-Capacity Doctrine] (the
employee is also advantaged by the fact that recovery under the statutory scheme is
usually much quicker and avoids the often excessive cost of a potentially unsuccessful
lawsuit).
5. See Lauer v. Tri-Mont Coop. Creamery, 287 Minn. 221, 225, 178 N.W.2d
248, 251 (1970).
6. See Brief for Appellant at 11, Egeland v. State, 408 N.W.2d 848 (1987) C8-86-
1586.
7. Id.
8. See infra notes 9, 14 and accompanying text.
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employer should not be protected from common law liability by the
exclusive-remedy provision.
II. THE EXCEPTIONS
The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized one exception to
the exclusive-remedy provision in the case of Boek v. Wong Hing.9 In
Boek, the plaintiff-employee was beaten and assaulted by the defend-
ant-employer.' 0 The employer hit the plaintiff with a heavy broom
handle and dislocated two of plaintiff's fingers." The Boek court
recognized the first exception to the exclusivity provision, which is
now referred to as the "intentional tort exception."1 2 The policy be-
hind this exception is that one who consciously and deliberately in-
tends to inflict injury should not be able to avoid damages by hiding
behind the Workers' Compensation Act.'
3
Other jurisdictions have adopted the "dual capacity" exception to
the exclusivity provision.14 This doctrine states that "an employer
normally shielded from tort liability may become liable to an em-
ployee if the employer has a second capacity that imposes obligations
independent of those imposed as an employer."1 5 In order to justify
a common law action against an employer under the dual capacity
doctrine, an injured employee must show that the employer acted in
one of the following eight capacities:
9. 180 Minn. 470, 231 N.W. 233 (1930). In Boek, the Minnesota Supreme Court
recognized for the first time an exception to the exclusivity provision of the Workers'
Compensation Act found now at Minnesota Statutes section 176.031 (1986). The
court has referred to this exception as the "intentional tort exception." Kaess v.
Armstrong Cork Co., 403 N.W.2d 643, 644 (Minn. 1987). This is currently the only
exception to the exclusivity provision that Minnesota recognizes.
10. Boek, 180 Minn. at 470, 231 N.W. at 233.
11. Id. In the process of the attack, the plaintiff tried to protect himself by hold-
ing up his hand to protect his head. The defendant struck the plaintiff's hand, dislo-
cating two of plaintiff's finger joints.
12. Id. at 471, 231 N.W. at 234. The Boek court stated:
An employer who intentionally and maliciously inflicts bodily injuries on his
servant should occupy no better position than would a third party not under
a compensation act, and should not be heard to say, when sued at law for
damages, either that the injury was accidental or that it arose out of the
employment .... As between employer and employee wilfully [sic] and in-
tentionally inflicted bodily injuries should neither be regarded as accidental
nor as giving occasion for the application of the compensation act either for
recovery or defense.
Id. at 471-72, 231 N.W. at 234.
13. See id.
14. See, e.g., Dual Capacity Doctrine, supra note 4, at 560-81. The dual capacity doc-
trine has been designed to correct the anomaly of an employer shielding itself from
tort claims which arguably do not arise from the employment relationship via the
exclusivity provision. Id.
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1. Manufacturer or distributor of a defective product;
2. Provider of medical services;
3. Insurer;
4. Corporate subdivision or related corporation;
5. Government subdivision;
6. Owner of real estate;
7. Vendor; or
8. Statutory duty not imposed by Workers' Compensation Act.'
6
The concept underlying the dual capacity doctrine is that where an
employer acts in a second capacity unrelated to that of an employer,
and the employee is injured by some act of this second capacity, then
the exclusivity provision is not valid as a bar to common law claims
for damages related to the injury.' 7 Accordingly, a plaintiff should
not be barred from a common law claim merely because she happens
to be the tortfeasor's employee.I8
In Egeland v. State, 19 the Minnesota Supreme Court was faced with
the issue of whether or not to recognize the dual capacity exception
to the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation Act.20
The court in Egeland, however, declined to recognize this excep-
tion.21 The Egeland decision is important as it strongly indicates that
Minnesota will probably never recognize the dual capacity doctrine.
III. FACTS OF EGELAND V. STATE
On December 20, 1983, plaintiff Walter Egeland and an assistant
court administrator, Roberta Brandt, were traveling in plaintiff's
car.2 2 The plaintiff was a county court judge for both Lake and Cook
counties of Minnesota. 23 At the time of the accident, plaintiff was
returning to Two Harbors after holding traffic court in Silver Bay,
Minnesota. 2 4 The accident occurred when plaintiff's vehicle collided
with a snowplow owned by the State of Minnesota and operated by
its employee, Keith Olsen.25 The plaintiff suffered severe injuries as
a result of the collision.26
16. See Workers'Compensation, supra note 4, at 815-16. By suing an employer based
upon one of these eight relationships which are distinct from the employee-employer
relationship, the exclusivity-remedy provision can be avoided and the plaintiff can
bring suit under the common law.
17. See Note, supra note 1, at 821.
18. Id.
19. 408 N.W.2d 848 (Minn. 1987).
20. Id. at 849.
21. Id. at 851.




26. Id. The plaintiff suffered from severe multiple internal injuries, an aortic
tear, fractured dislocations of both hips, bilateral tibial plateau fractures, and a frac-
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The plaintiff commenced a lawsuit against Keith Olsen alleging
negligent operation of the snowplow. 27 Suit was also brought
against Olsen's employer, the State of Minnesota, as the plaintiff
claimed the state was vicariously liable. 28 The district court dis-
missed the suit on the grounds that the plaintiff was, as a matter of
law, a state employee. 29 As an employee of the state, the exclusive
remedy provision barred the plaintiff from suing his employer in
tort.3 0 The Minnesota Court of Appeals certified the matter to the
supreme court.3 '
IV. HISTORY OF THE DUAL CAPACITY RULE IN MINNESOTA
The first Minnesota case to address the dual capacity doctrine in a
strict products liability case was the Hennepin County District Court
case of Netherland v. Acae Tag Co.32 In Netherland, the plaintiff was
injured by a machine which was manufactured by the defendant-em-
ployer.33 The district court judge, noting that Minnesota had no
case law on point, ruled that the plaintiff's action was not within the
dual capacity doctrine and as such was barred by the exclusivity pro-
vision of the Workers' Compensation Act.3
4
The Minnesota Court of Appeals also grappled with the dual ca-
pacity doctrine in Terveer v. Norling Brothers Silo Co.3 5 The injured
plaintiffs in Terveer claimed that their employer was also the manufac-
turer of the scaffolding which was responsible for their injuries.
3 6
The court determined, however, that the employer was not in the
business of manufacturing or distributing the scaffolding.37 Accord-
ingly, the facts of the case did not fit within the dual capacity doc-
ture to the mid-thorasic spine. The plaintiff endured six operations and was hospital-
ized for 110 days. Consequently, the plaintiff suffered permanent disabilities and was
forced to retire on October 31, 1984. See Appellant's Brief, supra note 6, at 4.
27. Egeland, 408 N.W.2d at 849-50.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 850.
30. Id.; see also MINN. STAT. § 176.031 (1986).
31. Egeland, 408 N.W.2d at 849.
32. No. 753534 (Minn. 4th Dist. Ct. Apr. 13, 1979) (cited in Note, supra note 4, at
829).
33. Id. The plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits for his injuries.
Later, the plaintiff also attempted to sue the defendant-employer under the dual-
capacity doctrine exception. See Note, supra note 4, at 829.
34. Id. The district court, Judge Barbeau presiding, looked to the reasoning in
Douglas v. E. &J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977) for
guidance. Judge Barbeau adopted the Douglas court's reasoning and held that the
present claim was barred by the exclusive-remedy provision. Id.
35. 365 N.W.2d 279 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
36. See id. at 280; see also supra note 16 and accompanying text.
37. Terveer, 365 N.W.2d at 282.
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trine.38 The court noted, "this is not the proper case to consider
application of the dual capacity doctrine."s9
In Kaess v. Armstrong Cork Co. ,40 the heirs of Arthur Kaess brought a
wrongful death action against the manufacturers and sellers of insu-
lation containing asbestos, including Kaess' employer, MacArthur
Company.4l The company moved for partial summary judgment
based on the exclusivity provision of the Workers' Compensation
Act.4 2 The Kaess court adopted the view of Professor Arthur Larson
who has stated that "the 'dual capacity' doctrine is particularly unjus-
tifiable in products liability cases because the employer's obligation
to provide a safe workplace and a manufacturer's duty to provide a
safe product are closely related." 4 3 Further, the supreme court held
that "even if the 'dual capacity' doctrine were to be recognized in
Minnesota, it would not in this case permit a suit against
MacArthur. "44
The history of the dual capacity issue in Minnesota reveals that no
court up to the point of Egeland had ever explicitly accepted or re-
jected the doctrine. In fact, up to Egeland, the question was still open
as to whether Minnesota would join other jurisdictions which had
already recognized the dual capacity exception to the exclusivity
provision.
V. DOES EGELAND CLOSE THE DOOR ON THE
DUAL CAPACITY EXCEPTION?
The Minnesota Supreme Court in Egeland was faced head on with
the issue of whether or not it would recognize the dual capacity doc-
trine.4 5 In its analysis of the issues, the supreme court referred to
the doctrine as "generally discredited."46 The court quoted with ap-
proval the following from an Alaska Supreme Court decision:
Whatever frail vitality the dual capacity doctrine has in otherjuris-
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. 403 N.W.2d 643 (Minn. 1987).
41. Id. at 643-44. Arthur Kaess worked for 32 years for the MacArthur Com-
pany. The company was a contractor, distributor and manufacturer of insulation
products. The insulation products manufactured by MacArthur contained asbestos
fibers. In 1973, the use of asbestos in these insulation products was prohibited by
statute. Kaess developed lung cancer from exposure to asbestos and cigarette smok-
ing, and died in 1984. Workers compensation benefits paid a total of $201,500 to
Kaess and his family. Id. at 644.
42. Id. at 643.
43. Id. at 645. (citing A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 72.83, at 14-245).
44. Id.
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dictions, we do not think that it warrants adoption here. To do so
might undermine extensively the policy sought to be achieved by
the workmen's compensation act. There are endlessly imaginable
situations in which an employer might owe duties to the general
public, or to non-employees, the breach of which would be as-
serted to avoid the exclusive liability provision of our statute. It
would be an enormous, and perhaps illusory, task to draw a princi-
pled line of distinction between those situations in which the em-
ployee could sue and those in which he could not. The exclusive
liability provision would, in any event, lose much of its effective-
ness, and the workmen's compensation system as a whole might be
destablized. For these reasons, and because of the persuasiveness
of case law from other jurisdictions rejecting it, we reject the dual
capacity doctrine as the law of this state.
4 7
The Egeland court then stated that "[flor the reason so well stated
in [the Alaska case] we decline to adopt the 'dual capacity' doctrine
in this case."4 8 While the holding in Egeland purports to limit itself
to that particular case, the adoption of the above language from the
Alaska case quite clearly denotes a broader expanse.
VI. CONCLUSION
Even though Minnesota courts have never explicitly adopted or
rejected the dual capacity doctrine, the Egeland case seems to effec-
tively foreclose the dual capacity exception to the exclusive remedy
provision of the Workers' Compensation Act. Evidence of this con-
clusion can be found in the following quote by the court: "The dis-
trict court declined to adopt the 'dual capacity' doctrine, and, under
the facts of this case, we also refuse to recognize the 'dual capacity' doctrine
as an exception to section 176.031." 4 9 Further, the strong language em-
braced by the Minnesota Supreme Court from the Alaska case con-
clusively states that the dual capacity rule will not be recognized
because "[t]o do so might undermine extensively the policy sought
to be achieved by the workmen's compensation act." 50 Accordingly,
the issue of whether Minnesota will recognize the dual capacity ex-
ception appears to be foreclosed by the strong language of the Ege-
land decision.
47. Id. (quoting State v. Purdy, 601 P.2d 258, 260 (Alaska 1979)).
48. Id.
49. Id. (emphasis added).
50. Id. (quoting Purdy, 601 P.2d at 260 (Alaska 1979)).
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Employment Law: MINNESOTA ADOPTS THE "PUBLIC POLICY" EXCEP-
TION TO THE AT-WILL DOCTRINE: Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Co.,
408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987).
I. INTRODUCTION
In Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining Co.,' the Minnesota Supreme
Court, for the first time, recognized the public policy exception to
the employment-at-will doctrine,2 and further refined the analysis of
defamation actions arising out of employment.3 The Phipps decision
represents a change in the legal relationship between employers and
employees in Minnesota. In Phipps the court relied on recently en-
acted legislation as the basis for modifying the employment-at-will
doctrine.4 The court's use of the statute, however, in fashioning an
analytical structure for public policy cases is troubling because it ap-
pears to have subtly changed the burden of proof required to make a
prima facie case away from that intended by the plain meaning of the
statute.
5
1. 408 N.W.2d 569 (Minn. 1987).
2. See id. at 571. Under the at-will doctrine, employment "may be terminated by
either party at any time, and no action can be sustained in such case for a wrongful
discharge." Skagerberg v. Blandin Paper Co., 197 Minn. 291, 302, 266 N.W. 872,
877 (1936). The Minnesota Supreme Court has followed the modern trend in recog-
nizing exceptions to the at-will doctrine. See, e.g., Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc'y, 389 N.W.2d 876, 887-88 (Minn. 1986) (recognizing defamation in wrongful
discharge situations); Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622, 627 (Minn.
1983) (recognizing an implied-in-fact contract exception); see also Comment, Employ-
ment Defamation Expands Employer Liability in the At-Will Context, 13 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 585 (1987) (explaining the development of exceptions to the doctrine in Minne-
sota, particularly focusing on defamation claims).
The public policy exception is the most widely accepted modification of the at-
will doctrine. Note, Protecting Employees At Will Against Wrongful Discharge: The Public
Policy Exception, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1931, 1931 (1983). Three-fifths of the states recog-
nize a wrongful discharge cause of action. Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 571. At least 25
states have recognized a public policy exception. See Phipps v. Clark Oil & Refining
Co., 396 N.W.2d 589, 591 n.2 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986).
The fundamental rationale underlying the public policy exception is the idea that
employers should be constrained from discharging employees for taking actions in
conformance with the law. Note, supra at 1936. Generally, courts have applied the
exception to three fact situations: termination for refusal to commit an unlawful act
(refusing to lie under oath); for performance of a public service (jury duty); or for
exercising a statutory right or privilege (filing a worker's compensation claim). Id. at
1937 n.49-52.
3. 408 N.W.2d at 573-74. See generally Comment, supra note 2.
4. MINN. STAT. § 181.932 subd. 1(c) (1987). See also infra notes 27-29 and ac-
companying text.
5. See infra notes 29-35 and accompanying text (discussing the burdens of proof
required under the statute and Phipps).
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Mark Phipps was employed by Clark Oil as a cashier in a self-ser-
vice gas station. On November 17, 1984, a handicapped customer
asked Phipps to put leaded gas into a car equipped to operate on
unleaded gas. Phipps was willing to pump unleaded gas into the ve-
hicle, but refused to pump leaded gas, believing that to do so was a
violation of the law.6 The station manager directed Phipps to pump
leaded gas into the car. When Phipps refused to do so, the station
manager immediately fired him. Later, in response to an investiga-
tion by the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency, Clark Oil manage-
ment stated that Phipps was fired because he "may have refused to
provide full service to a handicapped customer." 7
Phipps filed suit in September, 1985, alleging wrongful termina-
tion and defamation.8 Clark Oil moved for judgment on the plead-
ings. The trial court granted the motion, stating that because Phipps
was an at-will employee he could be discharged for any reason.9 The
court of appeals, relying on dicta in Hunt v. IBM Mid America Employ-
ees Federal Credit Union 10 and Lewis v. Equitable Life Assurance Society, I I
recognized a public policy exception to the at-will doctrine. The
court, reasoning that "important societal interests oppose an em-
ployer's conditioning employment on required participation in un-
lawful conduct," found that "[a]n employer's authority over its
employee does not include the right to demand that the employee
commit a criminal act."1 2 The court then analyzed the Federal Clean
Air Actl3 to determine whether pumping leaded gas into the car
would have violated the law.14 Finding that such an act would be a
violation of the law, the court of appeals reversed and remanded for
a trial on the merits.15 The supreme court's decision, unlike that of
the court of appeals, did not discuss the policy reasons for recogniz-
ing the public policy exception.16 Instead, the court simply noted
6. Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 570.
7. Phipps, 396 N.W.2d at 594.
8. Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 570.
9. Phipps, 396 N.W.2d at 589-90. Because Clark Oil asserted a qualified privi-
lege defense to the defamation action, Phipps moved to amend the complaint to al-
lege malice. The trial court also denied that motion. Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 570. In
affirming the court of appeals' reversal and remand, the supreme court directed that
the trial court grant Phipps' motion for leave to amend the complaint. Id. at 574.
10. 384 N.W.2d 853, 858-59 (Minn. 1986).
11. 389 N.W.2d 876, 893-96 (Minn. 1986) (Kelly, J., dissenting); see also Phipps,
396 N.W.2d at 590, 593.
12. Phipps, 396 N.W.2d at 592.
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7642 (1983).
14. Phipps, 396 N.W.2d at 593-95.
15. Id. at 595.
16. Compare Phipps, 396 N.W.2d at 591-93 with Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 571.
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the passage of the statute and affirmed the decision of the court of
appeals.17
III. ANALYSIS
While the major impact of the Phipps decision is its recognition of a
public policy exception to the at-will doctrine,18 the court also used
the case to further refine the analysis of employment defamation
claims. Phipps alleged that he was defamed when Clark Oil told state
admininstrative personnel he was discharged for refusing service to a
handicapped person.' 9 The court held that the statement was one in
which there could possibly be a defamatory meaning and therefore,
judgment on the pleadings was not appropriate.20 The court of ap-
peals recently interpreted this aspect of the Phipps decision as mean-
ing that judgment on the pleadings is not proper if the statement is
"reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning."21 The most
troubling aspect of Phipps, however, is its analysis of public policy
wrongful discharge cases.
Clark Oil argued that the courts should leave revision of the at-will
doctrine to the legislature.22 Noting that the legislature had enacted
17. Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 571, 574.
18. See infra notes 22-37 and accompanying text. The Phipps court refused to
allow punitive damages in the wrongful discharge action. In reaching the decision to
withhold punitive damages, the court noted that other jurisdictions have done so in
cases first recognizing this cause of action because "the employer could not have
anticipated beforehand that the claim would even be actionable." Phipps, 408
N.W.2d at 573. In view of the court's holding that the Clean Air Act embodies a
clearly mandated public policy which even protects whistleblowers, this result is inex-
plicable. See infra text note 26 accompanying note 26.
19. Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 570; Phipps, 396 N.W.2d at 589, 594. See supra text
accompanying note 7.
20. Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 573. The court did not accept Clark Oil's argument,
and the conclusion of the trial court, that Phipps acknowledged the truth of the state-
ment in his complaint. Rather, the court found judgment on the pleadings inappro-
priate if the "statment may be defamatory if false." Id.
The court went to lengths to explain Phipps' contention that he had not refused
to serve a customer because of the handicap. The court reiterated Phipps' allegation
that "[a]t all times plaintiff was willing to dispense unleaded gasoline into the subject
vehicle." Id. Despite the literal truth of Clark Oil's statement, the court said that
where a statement could also have a defamatory meaning, judgment on the pleadings
was inappropriate. Id.
21. Bohdan v. Alltool Mfg., Co., 411 N.W.2d 902, 907 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
The plaintiff asserted that statements had been made which falsely implied his sexual
preference was other than heterosexual. The plaintiff asserted that these statements
were made in the workplace. Because "[tihe alleged actions and statements by the
[defendants were] at least reasonably susceptible of a defamatory meaning," the
court of appeals held that judgement on the pleadings was not appropriate. Id. at
904. The case is also notable for its recognition of a cause of action for negligent
infliction of emotional distress arising out of the defamation action. Id. at 909.
22. Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 570-71. See also Hunt, 384 N.W.2d at 859 (citing Mar-
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legislation incorporating the public policy exception,23 the supreme
court rejected the argument.2 4 The court stated that "[t]he only
question that remains is whether we should ... [apply the] public
policy exception to the November 17, 1984, discharge of Phipps."25
The Phipps court found "It]he Clean Air Act . . . [represents a
clear] public policy to protect the lives of citizens and the environ-
ment." 26 The court held "that an employee may bring an action for
wrongful discharge if that employee is discharged for refusing to
participate in an activity that the employee, in good faith, believes
violates any state or federal law or rule or regulation adopted pursu-
ant to law." 2 7 The court's adoption of the language of the statute in
its holding would lead one to believe the court was, in effect, giving
the statute prospective effect.28 A comparison of the statute with the
analytical structure of public policy cases set out in Phipps, however,
belies that belief.
The Phipps court adopted the shifting burden of proof standard
suggested by the court of appeals for public policy cases. 29 To make
out a prima facie case of wrongful discharge in contravention of pub-
lic policy, the employee must demostrate that the discharge was mo-
tivated by the employee's good faith refusal to violate a clearly
mandated public policy.30 The burden then shifts to the employer to
show that the dismissal was for reasons other than those asserted by
the employee.31 The ultimate burden, then, is on the employee to
demonstrate that the discharge was for an impermissable reason.32
Before setting out this analytical structure, the court analyzed the
Clean Air Act to determine if Phipps would, in fact, have violated the
law if he had pumped leaded gas into the car. 33 It is this aspect of
rinan, Employment At-Will: Pandora's Box May Have an Attractive Cover, 7 HAMLINE L.
REV. 155, 200 (1984) (advocating that courts not act until legislation is enacted which
provides a clear standard of liability and provides a mechanism for dispute
resolution).
23. See MINN. STAT. § 181.932 (1987). The statute also requires employers to
give a true reason for termination to a discharged employee and bars defamation
actions based on that statement. Id. § 181.933 (1987).




28. Id. at 569. Phipps was decided on June 26, 1987. The effective date of the
statute was August 1, 1987. See MINN. STAT. § 645.02 (1986) (effective date of legis-
lation is August 1 unless the legislation itself indicates otherwise).
29. Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 571-72. This three-step process is that used in Title




33. Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 571. See 40 C.F.R. § 80.22(a) (1984) (regulation
promulgated under the act which prohibits the introduction of leaded gasoline into
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the court's analysis that is most troubling.
The focus on whether or not the law would actually have been vio-
lated shifts the inquiry away from the analysis indicated by the stat-
ute. The statute proscribes termination of an employee who refuses
to take an act "the employee, in good faith, believes"34 violates public
policy. The court appears to have shifted its analysis away from
whether or not the employee believes the act is a violation of public
policy, to an analysis of whether the refusal is a "good faith refusal to
violate the law."35 That this is more than a semantic difference is
demonstrated in the recent court of appeals case Freidrichs v. Western
National Autual Insurance Co. 36
In Freidrichs, the plaintiff alleged that he had been discharged for
doing his job in compliance with the law.37 Freidrichs was a pressure
vessel inspector for Western. He alleged he was fired for refusing to
refrain from reporting violations of American Society of Mechanical
Engineers (ASME) safety standards.38 Following the analysis set out
in Phipps' the court of appeals analyzed the statute on pressure vessel
inspections to determine whether Freidrich's actions were in compli-
ance with the statute.3 9 Finding that if his allegations were true,
Freidrichs had acted in compliance with the statute, the court of ap-
peals reversed the grant of summary judgment and remanded the
case to the trial court.4 0
In both Phipps and Freidrichs, the courts analyzed statutes to deter-
mine whether the plaintiff's actions actually complied with the law.
The new legislation does not appear to require an employee's refusal
to perform an act be in actual compliance with the law. Rather, the
plain meaning of the statute allows an employee to refuse to perform
cars designed for unleaded by retailers or their employees). Clark Oil argued that
the Clean Air Act's remedies were sufficient to protect Phipps. See 42 U.S.C. § 7622
(protecting employees from retaliatory discharge who, at the direction of their em-
ployers, violate the law and then report the violation). The court of appeals, after a
brief analysis, decided the Act's remedies were not exclusive. Phipps, 396 N.W.2d at
593. The supreme court skirted the issue, pointing out that the federal statute was
designed to protect the employee "whistleblower," but did not provide protection to
the employee who simply refused to perform the illegal act. The court reasoned that
to protect the employee who performed the illegal act, and not the employee who
refused to act illegally, was illogical. Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 571.
34. MINN. STAT. § 181.932 subd. l(c) (1987) (emphasis added).
35. Phipps, 408 N.W.2d at 572 (emphasis added). An analysis of the statute might
be appropriate to determine if the belief was reasonable. The statute does not, how-
ever, require that the belief be reasonable, only that it be a good faith belief. See supra
note 34 and accompanying text.
36. 410 N.W.2d 62 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
37. Id.
38. MINN. STAT. § 183.59 (1984) (penalties for violations by inspectors). Id.
§ 183.60 subd. 1 (1984) (incorporates ASME standards into the law).
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an act which the employee believes is a violation of the law. The
court's analysis, however, has shifted the inquiry away from whether
the employee believes the action violates the law, to whether the act
refused is, in fact, a violation of the law.
IV. CONCLUSION
It should be noted that both Phipps and Freidrichs arose before the
August 1, 1987 effective date of the statute. 4 1 It is suggested here
that the court will modify its analysis in cases which arise after Au-
gust 1, 1987. Under the statute, the proper inquiry is into the em-
ployee's belief of what the law is, not into whether the employee's
interpretation of the law is correct. In conformance with the statute,
the court should make this modification of its analysis in public pol-
icy discharge cases. This small shift would bring the court's analysis
in line with the statute.
Standing: MINNESOTA EXTENDS STANDING TO PROPERTY OWNERS' As-
SOCIATION: Regency Condominium Association v. State, 410 N.W.2d 321
(Minn. 1987).
I. INTRODUCTION
Any person having any estate, right, title, or interest in or lien upon
any parcel of land, who claims that such property has been ...
[improperly assessed or taxed] may have the validity of the claim,
defense, or objection determined by the district court.., or by the
tax court .... 1
In Regency Condominium Association v. State,2 the Minnesota Supreme
Court reversed the tax court3 and held that a condominium unit
owners' association4 has standing, granted by the statute above, to
bring a single action challenging a county's taxation assessment valu-
ation of each unit in the condominium.5 The court based its decision
41. Mark Phipps was fired November 17, 1984. Phipps, 396 N.W.2d at 589.
Charles Friedrichs was fired March 3, 1982. Friedrichs, 410 N.W.2d at 63.
1. MINN. STAT. § 278.01 subd. 1 (1986).
2. 410 N.W.2d 321 (Minn. 1987).
3. Regency Condominium Ass'n v. County of Ramsey, No. TA-1095 (Minn.
T.C. July 2, 1986) (LEXIS, Sttax library, Minn. file).
4. As the court in Regency noted, under the Minnesota Uniform Condominium
Act, MINN. STAT. ch. 515A (1986 & Supp. 1987), the unit owners' association man-
ages the condominium. The court further noted that "membership in the association
consists exclusively of unit owners, and all unit owners must belong to the associa-
tion. MINN. STAT. § 515A.3-101 (1986). Regency, 410 N.W.2d at 322.
5. Regency, 410 N.W.2d at 324.
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on the fact that, under the Minnesota Uniform Condominium Act,6
the association has a statutory lien against all units for its annual as-
sessments. 7 In its very brief opinion, however, the supreme court
ignored issues which the tax court had raised below, and offered con-
clusory policy rationales to support its decision.
II. FACTS
The Regency Condominium Association filed a petition for review
of Ramsey County's 1985 tax assessment valuations for each of the
condominium's ninety-four separate units.8 The Association at-
tempted to file its petition on behalf of each of the condominium's
ninety-four units, rather than on its own behalf.9 The Ramsey
County Clerk of District Court, therefore, required the Association
to pay $3,008 -ninety-four times the normal $32 fee - to file its
petition.0 The Association paid the fee under protest and moved
the tax court for a declaratory judgement. I I In its motion, the Asso-
ciation requested a determination that it had standing to protest the
assessments against each of the units and should therefore be al-
lowed to file a single petition and pay only a single filing fee.12
After a hearing, the tax court entered its order denying the mo-
tion, ruling that the Association's "interest in the taxes assessed on
each individual parcel is too remote to permit it standing to bring
this petition in its own name."13 The tax court also denied the Asso-
ciation's subsequent motion for a new trial or a judgement in its
6. MINN. STAT. ch. 515A (1986 & Supp. 1987).
7. Regency, 410 N.W.2d at 323. The lien is codified at Minnesota Statute section
515A.3-115(a) (1986), which states that "the association has a lien on a unit for any
assessment levied against that unit from the time the assessment becomes payable."
Id.
8. Regency, 410 N.W.2d at 322. The Association filed its petition for determina-
tion pursuant to Minnesota Statute section 278.01 subdivision 1 (1986) (allows a pe-
titioner to include more than one parcel of land in the same petition). Regency, No.
TA-1095 (Minn. T. C. July 2, 1986).
9. Regency, No. TA-1095 (Minn. T.C. July 2, 1986).
10. See Regency, 410 N.W.2d at 323 n.l.
11. Regency, No. TA-1095 (Minn. T.C. July 2, 1986).
12. See id.
13. Id. In the memorandum accompanying its order, the tax court discussed
Minnesota Statute section 515A.3-102(a)(4), which allows a condominium associa-
tion to "institute, defend or intervene in litigation or administrative proceedings [in
its own name] on behalf of itself or two or more unit owners on matters affecting the
condominium." The court held, however, that the statute did not give the Associa-
tion standing to challenge tax assessments on individual units for at least three rea-
sons. First, the Association could not petition on its own behalf because it had no
direct interest in the property tax. Second, since no two unit owners could join in a
single petition "unless they share an interest in an individual parcel," the Association
should not be able to petition "on behalf of two or more unit owners." Finally, the
[Vol. 14
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favor. 14 The Association then appealed to the Minnesota Supreme
Court. '
5
The supreme court decision reversing the tax court was unani-
mous. 16 The court commenced its opinion with a review of condo-
minium law and a citation to subdivision (a) (4) of Minnesota
Statutes section 515A.3-102, which empowers an owners' association
to represent itself, or two or more unit owners, in legal
proceedings.17
Without discussing whether the statute gave the Association stand-
ing in this action because it represented itself, or because it repre-
sented "two or more unit owners in a matter affecting the
condominium,"18 the court simply stated that section 515A.3-
102(a)(4) makes the Association "a proper party to request adjudica-
tion of the claim that the condominium has been unfairly as-
sessed."19 Having summarily disposed of the problem of standing,
the court went on to discuss the Association's right to request review
of ninety-four separate assessments in one petition.
In this section of its opinion, the court looked to both section
278.01 of Minnesota Statutes, which authorizes "an action to deter-
mine the validity of a defense or objection to a tax on land,"20 and to
section 278.02, which allows a single petition to challenge the tax on
more than one parcel, 2 1 to determine whether the Association met
the requirements to maintain its action.22 The court then turned im-
mediately to the statute creating a lien in favor of the unit owners'
association for unpaid assessments. 23 The court held that "the asso-
ciation, as the holder of a lien on each parcel of the condominium,
has standing it in its own right to bring an action" challenging the
tax assessment. 2 4
court held that taxes on the individual units in no way affected the condominium as a
whole. Id.
The tax court further ruled that the Association's statutory lien for assessments
did make it
possible that the association will obtain title to a unit by foreclosure because
of non-payment of the assessment for which it has a lien. But, that chance is
too remote and speculative to be an "interest" or "lien" that the legislature
contemplated protecting when it enacted Section 278.01.
Id.
14. See id.
15. See Regency, 410 N.W.2d at 322.
16. See id. at 321.
17. Id. at 322.
18. MINN. STAT. § 515A.3-102 (a)(4) (1986).
19. Regency, 410 N.W.2d at 322.
20. MINN. STAT. § 278.01 (1986).
21. See id. § 278.02 (1986).
22. See Regency, 410 N.W.2d at 323.
23. See id. (quoting MINN. STAT. § 278.01 subd. 1).
24. Regency, 410 N.W.2d at 323.
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In the last section of its opinion, the court criticized the tax court's
analysis of the issue of standing.25 The court stated that a "vital in-
terest" is not the exclusive requirement for standing in an action.26
The court went on to explain that a party claiming to have standing
pursuant to a statute need not establish the vitality of its interest - it
need only meet the requirements of the statute. 27 The court was sat-
isfied that the Association's status as a lienor28 was sufficient to meet
the statutory requirement to challenge the tax assessment, even if
the probability that the Association would ever assert its lien was
slight.29
III. ANALYSIS
At the end of its opinion, the court set out what may have been the
primary basis for its reversal of the tax court:
Where, as here, the parcels are unquestionably related to each
other and justice, as well as judicial economy, is served by deter-
mining objections to the taxation of the entire condominium in one
proceeding, we see no reason to impose qualifications beyond
those imposed by the legislature.
3 0
Although the court's statement reads well, scrutinizing the holding
more closely reveals several possible flaws. First, the separate units
of a condominium are obviously related to each other through their
status as a condominium. The court, however, did not directly ad-
dress the tax court's contention that "each unit [of a condominium]
. . . constitutes for all purposes a separate parcel of real estate." 3 1
Moreover, although the statute does allow a petitioner to challenge
the assessments of more than one parcel if "the petitioner has an
estate, right, title, interest, or lien"32 in or on the parcel, the
supreme court in Regency relied exclusively on an obscure statutory
lien,33 which the tax court characterized as "remote and specula-
25. See id.
26. See id.
27. See id. at 323-24. In Regency, the supreme court quoted approvingly from a
United States Supreme Court case on standing in which the Court affirmed a decision
that the Sierra Club lacked standing to challenge commercial development in a na-
tional game refuge. The quotation explains the difference between the common law
concept of standing, which requires a "personal stake in the outcome of the contro-
versy," and legislative standing, through which a party may be entitled by statute to
maintain an action, even though the party lacks a "personal stake" in the action. See
Regency, 410 N.W.2d at 323-24 (quoting Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727 (1972)).
28. The association is a "lienor" pursuant to Minnesota Statute section 515A.3-
115(c) (1986).
29. See Regency, 410 N.W.2d at 323.
30. Id. at 324.
31. See Regency, No. TA-1095 (Minn. T.C. July 2, 1986).
32. MINN. STAT. § 278.02 (1986).
33. See MINN. STAT. § 515A.3-115(a) (1986).
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tive,"3 4 to meet the standing requirement.35
Second, although the court claims that allowing the Association to
file a petition on its own behalf promotes justice,36 there is no indica-
tion in the opinion that denying standing would affect the rights of
any party other than the Association.37 The Association, however,
claims standing pursuant to the statute precisely because it has no
direct interest in the action.38 As the tax court pointed out in its
memorandum, the Association has no ownership interest in any of
the condominium property and, unless it acquires a unit by purchase
or foreclosure, it has no direct tax liability on any condominium
property. 39 Furthermore, allowing the Association to file a single pe-
tition on behalf of each individual unit owner may work an injustice
in favor of condominium unit owners over individual owners of other
parcels of real property. Owners of other types of property are not
likely to be able to challenge their tax assessments as cheaply and
easily as a condominium association.40 The extent to which justice is
promoted is, therefore, questionable.
Finally, the court cites judicial economy as a consideration favor-
ing the allowance of ninety-four challenges in a single petition.41 On
its face, this is a sound justification. Allowing an association to file a
single petition in an effort to avoid having the tax court decide
ninety-four individual petitions is certainly an appealing option.
However, Regency is not likely to conserve as much judicial energy as
the reduction of ninety-four petitions to one petition might indicate.
One reason the savings may prove to be illusory is the fact that, as
a practical matter, it is extremely unlikely that each of the ninety-four
unit owners in Regency would have filed a petition challenging the tax
assessment. 4 2 Thus, the number of challenges actually avoided is
something less than ninety-three. Furthermore, every condominium
unit owners' association in Minnesota should now at least consider
the option of filing a challenge.43 Regency may, therefore, have the
34. Regency, No. TA-1095 (Minn. T.C. July 2, 1986).
35. See Regency, 410 N.W.2d 321.
36. Id. at 324.
37. Each individual unit owner may still challenge a tax assessment pursuant to
Minnesota Statute section 278.
38. Cf. Regency, 410 N.W.2d at 323 (stating that the Association has standing as a
lienor, rather than as a matter of "right").
39. See Regency, No. TA-1095 (Minn. T.C. July 2, 1986).
40. The condominium may be the only form of association of realty owners
which meets the standing requirement to challenge a tax assessment.
41. See Regency, 410 N.W.2d at 324.
42. Many individual owners may not even be aware of their right to petition; and,
for at least some of those who are aware, challenging the assessment may simply not
be worth the expense and effort.
43. Even if an Association's challenge is weak, it will be relatively inexpensive to
challenge the assessments, so might still be worth the effort.
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effect of encouraging some challenges which would not have oc-
curred before, and every new challenge chips away at the judicial
economy rationale.
Regency would produce another inefficiency if "determining objec-
tions to the taxation of the entire condominium in one proceed-
ing"4 4 creates any significant practical problems for the tax court or
the association. As the tax court emphasized in Regency, the condo-
minium is not taxed as a single entity - each individual unit is as-
sessed separately.45 Challenging those separate assessments in a
single action would put some associations in a very awkward position
in relation to their individual unit owner members. In a condomin-
ium where the varying size, location, or market value of each individ-
ual unit makes uniform assessments inequitable, the association will
have a difficult choice.
For efficiency, an association may choose to challenge the individ-
ual assessments in groups, based on such arbitrary or prearranged
criteria as size and location. For example, the association may chal-
lenge the assesments of all one bedroom units in a certain building
as a group, rather than disputing the assessment of each of those
units separately. That grouping may be unfair to some owners, how-
ever, if the one bedroom units on the third floor have a higher mar-
ket value than similar units on the first floor of the same building.46
Conversely, the association which chooses to challenge each individ-
ual assessment separately, as the owner would do in an individual
proceeding, will be in the undesirable position of having to argue the
relative values of its own member units. The complexity of that po-
tential conflict of interest is impressive.4
7
One more problem which could reduce Regency's effectiveness in
promoting judicial economy is the possibility that a dissenting or dis-
satisfied individual unit owner might want to challenge an associa-
tion's action, or escape the results of that action.48 In fact, as the tax
court pointed out in its memorandum, section 278.05 of Minnesota
44. Regency, 410 N.W.2d at 324.
45. See Regency, No. TA-1095 (Minn. T.C. July 2, 1986).
46. For a discussion of a closely analogous problem, see Note, Common Rights and
Obligations Among Unit Owners Under the Minnesota Uniform Condominium Act, 10 WM.
MITCHELL L. REV. 157 (1984).
47. Cf. id. (discussing equitable distribution of rights and obligations to parties
with differing interests in the condominium).
48. A dispute between two parties who are eligible to challenge the same tax
assessment would present an interesting conflict because the statute gives no gui-
dance at all on which party would be entitled to decide whether to maintain or drop
the challenge. And, the only case other than Regency on a party's rights under Minne-
sota Statute section 278.01 is International Harvester Co. v. State, 200 Minn. 242,
274 N.W. 217 (1937), in which the court held that a lessee who was contractually
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Statutes now allows the tax court to lower or raise a challenged as-
sessment, 49 which makes dissatisfied unit owners a more likely
possibility.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Minnesota Supreme Court's decision in Regency was based on
a defensible reading of both the Condominium Act and the statute
allowing property tax challenges; and the court might reasonably
have considered and rejected each of the contentions raised in this
summary and in the tax court's decision.50 But the court allowed
several questions to remain unresolved when it failed to address
them in its opionion.
After Regency Condominium Association v. State, every condominium
association in the state of Minnesota should at least consider rou-
tinely challenging the state's annual assessment valuations of the
condominium's individual units. If its owners are aware of the po-
tential practical problems and are willing to take the risk that their
taxes will be raised,51 they can pursue the single challenge very eco-
nomically, through their assoication.
Uniform Commercial Code: MINNESOTA REFINES THE SUPERWOOD Doc-
TRINE FOR RECOVERY OF ECONOMIC DAMAGES IN COMMERCIAL TRANS-
ACTIONS: Valley Farmers' Elevator v. Lindsay Brothers Co., 398 N.W.2d
553 (Minn. 1987); McCarthy Well Co., Inc. v. St. Peter Creamery, Inc., 410
N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1987).
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1981, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in Superwood Corp. v.
Siempelkamp Corp. ,1 held that "economic losses that arise out of com-
mercial transactions, except those involving personal injury or dam-
age to other property, are not recoverable under the tort theories of
negligence or strict products liability." 2 Recently, the Minnesota
49. See Regency, No. TA-1095 (Minn. T.C. July 2, 1986).
50. See id.
51. See MINN. STAT. § 278.05 (1986).
1. 311 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1981).
2. Id. at 162. In Superwood, the plaintiffs' press broke down due to a weak cylin-
der wall which was found, after inspection, to be well below the required stress and
safety specifications. The plaintiff brought suit in federal court alleging negligence,
strict liability, breach of warranty, and breach of contract. The federal court certified
three questions to the Minnesota Supreme Court in order to determine state law
concerning whether economic losses arising out of a commercial transaction could be
recovered under a negligence or strict liability theory. To preserve the Uniform
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Supreme Court has addressed several questions left unresolved in
the Superwood decision. In Valley Farmers' Elevator v. Lindsay Brothers
Co.,3 the supreme court adopted the predominant factor test 4 to de-
termine whether, and under what circumstances, a hybrid commer-
cial transaction involving both the sale of goods and the provision of
services falls within the statutory provisions of the Uniform Commer-
cial Code.5 The Valley Farmers' court held that Superwood applies to
hybrid commercial transactions which are predominantly a sale of
goods.6 Several months later, in McCarthy Well Co., Inc. v. St. Peter
Creamery, Inc. ,7 the Minnesota Supreme Court resolved the issue of
whether the Superwood holding was limited to Uniform Commercial
Code cases, or whether it applied to all commercial transactions.8
The supreme court held that "commercial transactions," as that
phrase is used in Superwood, means a transaction governed by the
Commercial Code's effectiveness, the supreme court held in the negative, following
the majority view. Id. at 161. See generally Note, Recovery of Economic Loss in Commercial
Transactions, 9 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 504 n.6, 8 (1983) (citing jurisdictions adopting
the majority position).
Apparently, if a plaintiff suffers economic loss from personal injury and/or dam-
age to other property, due to the defective product, then tort recovery for all dam-
ages would be allowed. See S.J. Groves & Sons, Co. v. Aerospatiale Helicopter Corp.,
374 N.W.2d 431, 433 (Minn. 1985). In S.J. Groves, the plaintiff sued a helicopter
manufacturer when the helicopter it purchased crashed due to an alleged defect
which eliminated the pilot's ability to control the pitch of the rotor blades, preventing
the helicopter from staying aloft. The defendant argued that the plaintiff's claim for
economic loss under a negligence and strict liability theory was precluded by the
Superwood decision. The federal district court certified the question to the Minnesota
Supreme Court. The supreme court noted: "As we indicated in Superwood, as long as
an individual seeks economic loss arising out of personal injury or damage to other
property, recovery lies outside the realm of warranty and accordingly the losses are
compensable in tort." Id. at 433. In S.J. Groves, however, the plaintiff was seeking
economic losses due only to damage to the helicopter itself, although personal inju-
ries arose from the same incident. The court continued: "What Groves seeks is re-
covery for the product's failure to live up to Groves' expectations as to its suitability,
quality and performance - even if a tort injury arose out of the same occurrence,
Groves did not suffer it, but lost only what it purchased." Id. at 434. The court also
took into account the plaintiff's loss of a "nominal amount" of other property, in-
cluding the loss of an aircraft radio and two pilot communication headsets,
purchased separately and installed by the plaintiff. Relying on Minneapolis Society
of Fine Arts v. Parker-Klein Assoc. Architects, Inc., 354 N.W.2d 816 (Minn. 1984),
the court determined that the other property damage was "insufficient to bootstrap
Groves' claims for tort recovery of all its damages." s.J Groves, 374 N.W.2d at 434
n.2.
3. 398 N.W.2d 553 (Minn. 1987).
4. See infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text.
5. Valley Farmers', 398 N.W.2d at 556.
6. Id. at 556-57.
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Uniform Commercial Code, thus limiting Superwood's applicability.9
Both Valley Farmers' and McCarthy Well evidence the Minnesota
Supreme Court's continuing attempt to preserve the integrity of the
Uniform Commercial Code's remedy provisions, and reinforce the
public policy need to protect the legitimate expectations of consum-
ers.' 0 As can be expected, the reality of these two decisions can be
both harsh and kind. Where economic loss occurs after the Uniform
Commercial Code's statute of limitations period has run, a plaintiff
may have no cause of action to recover damages arising out of a Uni-
form Commercial Code transaction." On the other hand, the
Superwood rule can be used as a defense only in limited situations.
Most importantly, consumers are not prevented by Superwood from
relying on a tort cause of action to recover economic losses unrecov-
erable under Uniform Commercial Code or general common law
contract principles.
This Casenote will focus on these two decisions as they provide
further understanding of the Superwood decision and its underlying
rationale. Particular attention will be given to the underlying con-
flicts evidenced by these recent supreme court decisions and to the
court's reasonable attempt to balance those conflicts.
II. VALLEY FARMERS' ELEVATOR v. LINDSAY BROTHERS CO.
A. Facts
Valley Farmers' Elevator contacted Lindsay Brothers, a distributor
of agricultural equipment and industrial supplies, to submit a propo-
sal for a grain drying and storage system.' 2 Lindsay Brothers ulti-
mately installed the system at a cost of approximately $500,000.13
The system's function was for grain storage, but more importantly,
its function was for retaining the stored grain in optimum condi-
tion.14 To fulfill its purpose, the storage bins incorporated a nega-
tive flow aeration system.' 5 Through the use of fans located at the
9. Id. at 315.
10. See Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 161-62. The Superwood court stated:
We, however, do not agree that the U.C.C. was intended to preempt the
entire area of products liability. Strict products liability developed in large
part to fill gaps in the law of sales with respect to consumer purchasers.
Limiting the application of strict products liability to consumers' actions or
actions involving personal injury will allow the U.C.C. to satisfy the needs of
the commercial sector and still protect the legitimate expectations of
consumers.
Id. at 162 (citations omitted).
11. See infra note 67 and accompanying text.
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base of the system to draw air through the bins, the stored grain was
kept dry and cool.16 While the owner's manual recommended the
installation of automatic controls, Valley Farmers' system was oper-
ated manually. 1
7
Nearly four years after installation, the storage bins collapsed.18
Apparently, one night after an employee turned the fans on, the ex-
terior roof vents, which had accumulated frost due to an increase in
humidity, prevented the free flow of air.19 A vacuum occurred be-
cause no air could flow into the system from above while the pumps
continued to draw air out from the base, resulting in the inward col-
lapse of the roof and sides of the bin.20 No damage occurred to the
grain itself.21
Valley Farmers' sued Lindsay Brothers for negligence, failure to
warn, and strict liability for damage to the storage bin.22 The trial
court granted Lindsay Brothers' motion for summary judgment,
holding that Superwood precluded Valley Farmers' from recovering
economic losses arising out of a commercial transaction under negli-
gence or strict liability theories.23 Valley Farmers' appealed and the
court of appeals affirmed. 24 Adopting the predominant factor test,
the supreme court upheld the court of appeals' decision.25
B. Court's Analysis
The supreme court found that the "substantial or predominant
purpose of the contract here was the sale of goods, not the rendition







22. Id. at 555.
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 556; see also infra notes 26-27 and accompanying text. The court re-
jected Valley Farmers' attempt to distinguish their position from the defendants in
Superwood and its progeny, on the ground that Valley Farmers' is a distributor rather
than a manufacturer. The court stated:
We reject the asserted manufacturer-distributor distinction, relying upon
explicit language contained in Article 2 defining a "merchant," . . . and de-
lineating a merchant's various rights and obligations .... In the doubtful
event that the legislature had intended to except the class of "merchants" or
distributors from the purview of Article 2 dealing with "transactions and
goods," it would certainly not have comprehensively addressed that class'
duties, rights and remedies.
Valley Farmers', 398 N.W.2d at 555 (citations omitted).
26. Id. at 556.
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ices and select component parts.27 These services, however, were
found to be incidental to the transaction. The supreme court noted
that any sale of goods generally requires incidental labor charges for
converting "raw materials into a useful product [or] [t]hat some ad-
ded service is required to install or apply the product ... "28 Thus,
while $120,000 of the full $500,000 contract price was related to
Lindsay Brothers' provision of services, "that factor is not persuasive
that the essence of the contract was the provision of services."29 The
court reasoned further that another "factor indicative of the tangen-
tial and incidental nature of those services" was that "no part of the
labor charge included in the contract [was] designated as compensa-
tion for the defendant's alleged design of the system." 30
Justice Yetka, in a dissenting opinion, refused to hold that the Uni-
form Commercial Code should govern Valley Farmers' cause of ac-
tion.31 He stated:
However, I am willing to accept the logic that a commercial buyer
complaining of a defect in a good, such as a piece of machinery or a
storage bin, should be relegated to the U.C.C. rules designed to
regulate the sale of goods uniformly. What is not clear, however, is
that the U.C.C. rules should apply to the appellant's particular
cause of action in this case; for the defect complained of here was
not in a good sold, but in important design services that were
neglected. 32
The gravamen ofJustice Yetka's argument was that it was inconsis-
tent to hold that Valley Farmers' could purchase Lindsay Brothers'
expertise, but not "sue on the basis of defects in this expertise." 3 3
Had outside architects been hired to design the storage bin, a cause
of action for negligence against the architects would exist.34 Finally,
to analyze a commercial transaction on such a separated basis would
not contravene the Superwood decision. Superwood "has not barred fu-
ture courts from defining commercial transactions so as to exclude
services aspects." 35 Furthermore, the Uniform Commercial Code
was not intended to apply to transactions where "[a]n important part





31. Id. at 557-58 (Yetka, J., dissenting).




36. Id. at 558.
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III. MCCARTHY WELL Co., INC. V. ST. PETER CREAMERY, INC.
A. Facts
As a result of increasing production volume, St. Peter Creamery
wished to restore its artesian well to its original capacity.37 The
creamery contracted with McCarthy Well to increase the flow of
water in its well.38 McCarthy Well air-lifted sixty feet of sand from
the well bottom and pulled a copper liner out of the well casing.39
The flow of water still did not increase, until after McCarthy Well
detonated several dynamite charges at the bottom of the well cav-
ity.40 McCarthy Well later completed the installation of a turbine
pump which it recommended to the creamery. 4 1 McCarthy Well
billed St. Peter Creamery for nearly $35,000, which included the cost
of the new turbine at approximately $8,500.42 After St. Peter
Creamery made only partial payment, McCarthy Well commenced
suit to recover the balance.43 The creamery counterclaimed, alleg-
ing negligence and misrepresentation.44
Both parties were found negligent. McCarthy Well was found lia-
ble for seventy-five percent of the $190,000 in damages sought by
the creamery. 45 McCarthy Well appealed, arguing the Superwood de-
cision precluded St. Peter Creamery from recovering its economic
losses under a negligence theory.46 The Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals held that Superwood did not prevent the creamery from recover-
ing economic losses resulting from the negligent performance of
services. 4 7 The supreme court affirmed.48
B. Court's Analysis
McCarthy Well based its argument on a literal reading of
Superwood, which held that "economic losses that arise out of com-
mercial transactions . . . are not recoverable under the tort theories
of negligence or strict products liability."49 McCarthy Well argued
that Superwood applies to all commercial transactions, and that the
37. McCarthy Well, 410 N.W.2d at 313.









47. Id. at 313.
48. Id. at 315.
49. Superwood, 311 N.W.2d at 162.
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doctrine was not limited only to Uniform Commercial Code cases. 50
Moreover, McCarthy Well argued that a similar rule had been ap-
plied equally to Uniform Commercial Code and non-Uniform Com-
mercial Code services transactions in a majority of jurisdictions.51
The supreme court's analysis began with a review of the Superwood
decision. Acknowledging that it had not expressly defined "commer-
cial transaction" in that decision, the court noted: "A review of our
decision in Superwood shows that, as used in Superwood, a 'commercial
transaction' is a transaction governed by Article 2 of the Uniform
Commercial Code, Minn. Stat. ch. 336 (1986)."52 The court
continued:
The Superwood rule is premised on the existence of certain rights
and remedies provided for in the U.C.C.: 'The U.C.C. clarifies the
rights and remedies of parties to commercial transactions . . . To
allow tort liability in commercial transactions would totally emascu-
late [the warranty and liability] provisions of the U.C.C.' The ra-
tionale behind the Superwood rule is that a recognition of tort
actions in cases under the U.C.C. would upset the remedies con-
tained in the U.C.C.; when the rationale is not applicable, i.e., when
the U.C.C. does not apply, there is no reason for the Superwood rule
to apply. 53
The supreme court then expressly held that" 'commercial transac-
tion,' as that phrase is used in Superwood, means a transaction gov-
erned by the U.C.C. When the U.C.C. does not apply, the
transaction is not a 'commercial transaction,' and the Superwood rule
does not apply."54
The court went on to apply the predominant factor test, adopted
in Valley Farmers', to the McCarthy Well - St. Peter Creamery transac-
tion.55 It concluded that the transaction was predominantly a provi-
sion of services.56 The court looked to the work McCarthy Well
performed to determine whether the transaction was a sale of goods,
connected with the incidental provision of services.57 Except for the
sale of a turbine pump, the transaction, as a whole, strictly involved
the provision of services.58 The bill sent to St. Peter Creamery con-
firmed the court's analysis.59 Of the total $34,573.27, only
50. See Brief for Appellant at 26-29, McCarthy Well Co., Inc. v. St. Peter Cream-
ery, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1987) (C6-85-1740).
51. Id. at 26.
52. McCarthy Well, 410 N.W.2d at 314.
53. Id. at 314-15 (citations omitted).
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$8,329.45 was attributable to the sale of the new turbine pump.60
Thus, the McCarthy Well - St. Peter Creamery transaction was not a
"commercial transaction," as that phrase is used in Superwood be-
cause it was predominantly a provision of services.61 As a result,
Superwood did not bar the creamery from recovering its damages
under a negligence theory.
III. ANALYSIS
When the Superwood court adopted the rule preventing commercial
plaintiffs from recovering economic losses arising out of transactions
governed by the Uniform Commercial Code, it recognized the
supremacy of the Code in governing commercial relationships. At
the same time, in Superwood and its progeny, the court has recognized
the Code's inability to fully protect the needs of the consumer. 6 2 In
the Valley Farmers' and McCarthy Well decisions, the Minnesota
Supreme Court has continued to fashion the general rule in such a
manner that both the Code's supremacy and the consumer's legiti-
mate expectations are maintained. Neither decision upsets or skews
the general rationale underlying the Superwood decision.
The Valley Farmers' court followed at least twenty-one other states
in adopting the predominant factor test.63 In adopting this test, the
supreme court's ruling consistently followed from earlier supreme
court decisions involving the sale of goods.
64
Still, Justice Yetka's dissenting opinion has some theoretical ap-
peal. The sting of the majority's opinion illuminates his concerns.
When Article Two of the Uniform Commercial Code applies, a
timely action for breach of warranty must be commenced within four
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. See supra note 2 (discussing personal injury and other property damage ex-
ceptions to the Superwood rule).
63. See Annotation, Applicability of UCC Article 2 to Mixed Contracts for Sale of Goods
and Services, 5 A.L.R.4th 501, 506 (1981).
64. See O'Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural Gas Co., 253 N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1977)
(U.C.C. warranty applicable to product installations); Kopet v. Klein, 275 Minn. 525,
148 N.W.2d 385 (1967) (Uniform Sales Act warranty applicable to sale involving
transfer of chattel and related service).
The Valley Farmers' court also followed the guidelines discussed in Bonebrake v.
Cox Co., 499 F.2d 951 (8th Cir. 1974) to determine when a hybrid commercial trans-
action is governed by the Uniform Commercial Code. The Bonebrahe court stated:
The test for inclusion or exclusion is not whether they are mixed, but, grant-
ing that they are mixed, whether their predominant factor, their thrust, their
purpose, reasonably stated, is a rendition of service, goods incidentally in-
volved (e.g. contract with artist for painting) or is a transaction of sale, with
labor incidentally involved (e.g. installation of water heater in a bathroom).
Id. at 960 (footnotes omitted).
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years after tender of delivery. 65 Where economic losses arise after
the four year statute of limitations period expires, as was the case in
Valley Farmers', no cause of action exists to recover those economic
losses. This result seems especially harsh when the damages arise
due to negligent design services rather than a defect in the product
provided. Generally, such services standing alone would not be gov-
erned by the Uniform Commercial Code remedies. Where a sale of
goods is the thrust of the transaction, however, the negligent serv-
ices are bootstrapped into the Code's remedial framework.
Nevertheless, the majority's opinion is fair and equitable. Statutes
of limitations are not a new phenomena. While they can be harsh, at
the same time they serve the necessary judicial function of preserv-
ing efficiency. In effect, statutes of limitation must act blindly in or-
der to serve that function. These statutes do not distinguish between
what may or may not be a "stale" claim.
Moreover, the majority opinion is the result of important public
policy concerns. Valley Farmers' was a commercial plaintiff. The law
assumes that a commercial plaintiff has substantially equal bargain-
ing power with a seller, and that a commercial plaintiff can protect
itself by negotiation.6 6 A buyer can negotiate for a lower price by
relieving the seller from the risk attributed to the responsibility for a
defective product. Conceivably, a buyer can further protect itself by
bargaining as to a product's actual specifications. In this situation,
where "failure of coverage is attributable not to 'gaps' in consumer
remedies that tort remedies should correct but, rather, to the plain-
tiff's conscious choice," 6 7 the supreme court has rightfully refused to
allow recovery in tort.
While Valley Farmers' is consistent in maintaining the supremacy of
the Code in commercial transactions, McCarthy Well is equally consis-
tent in its support of the legitimate expectations of consumers by
refusing to extend Superwood beyond its applicable rationale. The
McCarthy Well court specifically limits Superwood to transactions where
commercial buyers and sellers can negotiate over the price of goods,
65. MINN. STAT. § 336.2-725 (1), (2) (1986).
66. See S.J Groves, 374 N.W.2d at 434.
67. Id. A commercial buyer, however, cannot negotiate with a seller to extend
the statute of limitations period beyond four years from tender of delivery. General-
Ily, except where the Code expressly prohibits it, the parties to a contract may vary
the effect of provisions of the Code by agreement, subject to the "obligations of good
faith, diligence, reasonableness and care." MINN. STAT. § 336.1-1-2 (3) (1986).
Minnesota Statute section 336.2-725 (1) (1986) expressly prohibits parties to a
contract from opting out of the four-year statute of limitations period. It provides:
An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within
four years after the cause of action has accrued. By the original agreement
the parties may reduce the period of limitations to not less than one year but
may not extend it.
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and negotiate whether the buyer or seller should bear the risk of lia-
bility due to a defective product. Adopting McCarthy Well's argu-
ment would have violated the Superwood rationale. This argument
would mean that in any type of commercial transaction, including
those involving only a sale of services or an incidental sale of goods,
plaintiffs would be strictly precluded from recovering damages
under a tort cause of action. A negligent defendant would be insu-
lated from responsibility for its negligent acts. 6 8 For example, "if a
business calls a plumber to install a toilet and the plumber in install-
ing the toilet uses a torch and somehow carelessly burns down the
building, there would be no recovery." 69 The Superwood court never
intended to extend its decision into such an unsupportable position.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since Superwood, and as a result of its decision in Valley Farmers' and
McCarthy Well, the Minnesota Supreme Court has implicitly deline-
ated three types of categories of commercial transactions. The first
category of commercial transactions involve the sale of goods only.
The Superwood doctrine applies to this category of transactions. The
second category of commercial transactions involves only the provi-
sion of services. The Superwood doctrine does not apply to this cate-
gory of transactions. The third category of commercial transactions
involves both the sale of goods and provision of services. The
Superwood doctrine applies to this category of transactions only if,
under the Valley Farmers' standard, the transaction is predominantly a
sale of goods.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has refused to apply Superwood be-
yond its applicable rationale. In doing so, it has maintained the in-
tegrity of the Superwood doctrine. This refusal limits its potentially
harsh results to only certain commercial transactions, in which com-







68. See Brief for Respondent at 12-14, McCarthy Well Co., Inc. v. St. Peter
Creamery, Inc., 410 N.W.2d 312 (Minn. 1987) (C6-85-1740).
69. Id. at 14.
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